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Abstract
This article addresses the responsibilitiesof counsel when confronted with credible evidence of
corporate malfeasance and the consequences counsel may suffer if compelled to discharge the obligations established in Sarbanes Oxley and the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC)
1.13 and 1.6. Set in the context of a mega mining construction project in Latin America, the
article leads the reader through a hypothetical case involving international commercial, governmental, and union bribery, analyzing whether such conduct violates the U.S. Travel Act, the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, the U.K Bribery Act, and the Taft-Hartley Act. If so, the article then
considers what counsel must do if his or her employer persists in illegal conduct. As a result of this
analysis, this article arguesfor a change in U.S. securities regulation to afford the same protections
to counsel as those given to the ChiefFinancialOfficer (CFO) and external auditors;namely that a
SEC Form 8-K be filed upon the departure of the Chief Legal Officer (CL 0).
Introduction
Resist, resign, or retire quietly (but not quite voluntarily), or be sued by shareholders:
Are these the only outcomes for the CLO confronted with management's refusal to alter
conduct that counsel reasonably concludes, upon credible evidence, to be illegal or a
breach of fiduciary duty? Is there anything counsel can do to protect against an outcome
that may result in an unexpected period of unemployment? If not, should federal securi* David A. Delman, a partner at Hogan Lovells located in Houston, Texas, has extensive experience
litigating a wide range of complex matters in State and Federal Courts around the nation as well as in
international arbitration. Mr. Delman is a graduate of the American University School of International
Service (Summa Cum Laude) and the Georgetown University Law Center (Magna Cum Laude.) Prior to
joining Hogan Lovells, Mr. Delman served as Executive Vice President, Chief Legal Officer, and Secretary to
a large international publically traded engineering and construction company.
** Paul A. Bruno serves as the Managing General Counsel of Fluor Corporation, a multi-billion dollar
publicly traded engineering and construction services corporation headquartered in Irving, Texas. Mr. Bruno
is a graduate of the University of California (with Honors), Santa Clara Law School and attended the
executive program at Stanford Graduate School of Business. Mr. Bruno is a Fellow of the American College
of Construction Lawyers.
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ties law be revised to specifically provide that a Form 8-K be filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) upon the departure of the CLO, advising
the Commission and shareholders of a change in the leadership of the public company's
legal function?
Presently, the SEC's protections extend to the CFO, but not the CLO. It remains true
that a CEO may summarily dismiss the CLO at will, without cause, and absent board
knowledge or shareholder approval. Notwithstanding this lack of protection, Congress,
through its enactment of the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley or SOX), has called upon in-house counsel, and the
CLOs of U.S. registrants in particular, to be the gatekeepers against malfeasance by senior
corporate management. This article addresses why SOX, coupled with corresponding
changes to the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC), has failed to prevent, as it was intended to do, what many believe to be a breathtaking level of corporate
abuse leading to the near collapse of the U.S. economy in late 2008.
To put into context the obligations of professional conduct imposed on lawyers by federal securities law and professional ethical rules (as reflected by the MRPC), consider the
following hypothetical: During a visit to a multi-billion dollar mining project being undertaken for a privately owned minerals company, the Division General Counsel for the
prime engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) contractor (who is incorporated
in Delaware and headquartered in California) learns that hundreds of thousands of dollars,
and perhaps more (internal audit pending), were paid to certain mid-level executives of the
mineral company to secure the contract award. The monies came from a fund controlled
by the President of the EPC contractor's mining division which, in turn, came from "rebates" paid by certain vendors under "preferred" master service agreements. Given that
the EPC contractor is multinational, it maintains a unitary banking relationship with a
major U.S. banking institution in which monies from all subsidiaries are deposited and
from which all payments originate.
The Division General Counsel also learns through the course of her visit that tens of
thousands of dollars, and perhaps more (internal audit pending), were paid to various governmental officials to substantially expedite the receipt of business and professional licenses, building and environmental permits, and entry visas for highly trained and
exceedingly efficient Thai and Polish welders. Counsel also learned that expensive cars,
boats, and trips to Disneyland were supplied to union leaders to secure their consent to
the use of the foreign labor and to avoid labor disturbances. The monies to fund these
payments, all of which were funneled through intermediaries, came from accounts
originating in the United States. The monies came from "rebates" paid by private subcontractors in exchange for preferential selection by the EPC contractor to perform services on the project.
The payments to the client's executives were critical to securing the work. Specifically,
the payments to the government officials for business licenses, permits, and entry visas
were essential to shorten the as-bid schedule completion date, making the contractor's bid
highly competitive. Even with the payments to the client's executives, the contractor may
not have been awarded the work. But because the contractor presented a schedule that
was two months shorter than its closest competitor, it gave the contractor a competitive
advantage. Further, the importation of foreign welders was essential to improve labor
efficiency and lower cost. Again, this gave the contactor a competitive advantage, without
VOL. 46, NO. 4
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which the contractor may not have secured the work. Finally, the payments to the union
officials were necessary to ensure the safety of the foreign labor and to avoid highly disruptive labor strikes. Without such payments, labor strikes would be inevitable, exposing
the contractor, at a minimum, to huge liquidated damages for delay, and, at worst, to
termination for default for failure to maintain a safe work site and meet critical schedule
milestones.
After walking the project with a couple of area superintendents and the lead projectcontrols engineer, Counsel learns that the project's date for mechanical completion has
been artificially held firm and that numerous logic ties in the critical path method (CPM)
schedule provided to the client in hard copy have been broken to ensure that the completion date shown to the client remained the same over the past nine months. Both superintendents and the lead controls engineer say that they have been instructed to do this by
the executive project director, but that everyone knows the forecasted completion date is a
complete fiction and that the project is at least nine to twelve months late. When Counsel
asks about the cost forecast, everyone laughs. The controls engineer says: "What do you
think, a year late and costs don't rise? Is this The Twilight Zone or what?" With a bit of
prodding, the controls engineer admits that he really doesn't know how much more the
project will cost, because he has been told not to perform such an analysis. Rather, he has
been told to develop claims against the client and subcontractors, because the executive
project director is convinced that all delays are the responsibility of the client or its separate contractors. More importantly, the executive project director does not want to report
to corporate that the project is in major financial meltdown. Reporting such negative
information would not only ruin his division's quarterly financial report, but it might also
cause the company to incur such a huge accounting charge that its banking covenants
would be breached, imperiling the company's very existence.
Walking back to the administrative trailers, the lead controls engineer explains to
Counsel the methods by which he and his hand-picked claims consultant have calculated
cost recovery claims in excess of $90 million (representing about half of the total current
projected cost overrun) and entitling the contractor to an eleven-month extension of time.
As the engineer talks, Counsel's eyes begin to glaze over-the drone of the engineer's
voice reminds her of the sound of the engine of the airplane from which she just stepped
off a few hours earlier. With great concentration, Counsel hears something to the effect
of "none of it's our fault," and "the President has booked the claim value in the cost
report." Then, with a bit of mumble, the controls engineer says that without the extension of time, the contractor will be exposed to $110 million in liquidated damages and a
total project loss currently estimated to be at $180 million, if things do not get any worse.
Outside, torrents of rain begin to fall, heralding an early start of the rainy season.
To assess Counsel's professional obligations, we must first determine whether any of the
payments uncovered during her trip constitute illegal activity and why.
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I. The Payment of Commercial Bribes to Non-Public Foreign Persons Is
Illegal Under the "Travel Act" If Applicable State Law Proscribes Such
Bribes
The Travel Act makes bribery of non-public officials within or outside of the United
States a felony if commercial bribery of such persons is prohibited by applicable state law.'
Thus, the Travel Act criminalizes the use of travel, mail, telephone, or wire transfer with
the intent to carry on or facilitate any unlawful activity, including "bribery... in violation
of the laws of the State in which committed or of the United States." 2 Unlike the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which directly criminalizes bribery of public officials for
the purpose of inducing an act or decision that assists "in the obtaining or retaining of
business," 3 the Travel Act does not criminalize the bribe itself, but rather the instrument
used to carry out the bribe (e.g., international travel, telephone calls, or wire transfers).4
Championed by then Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy in 1961, Congress passed
the Travel Act in response to the activities of U.S. organized crime syndicates engaged in
gambling, prostitution, narcotics, labor extortion, and collecting usurious interest through
force and violence. 5 As Attorney General Kennedy made clear in his testimony before
Congress: "The main target of our bill is interstate travel to promote gambling. It also is
aimed at the huge profits in the traffic in liquor, narcotics, prostitution, as well as the use
of these funds for corrupting local officials and for their use in racketeering in labor and

1. The Travel Act provides:
(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses the mail or any facility in interstate
or foreign commerce, with intent to- (1) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity; or (2)
commit any crime of violence to further any unlawful activity; or (3) otherwise promote, manage,
establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on, of any
unlawful activity, And thereafter performs or attempts to perform- an act described in paragraph
(1) or (3) shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both; or (B) an act
described in paragraph (2) shall be fined under this tile, imprisoned for not more than 20 years,
or both, and if death results shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life.
(b) As used in this section (i) "unlawful activity" means (1) Any business enterprise involving
gambling, liquor on which the Federal excise tax has not been paid, narcotics or controlled substances (as defined in section 102(6) of the Controlled Substances Act), or prostitution offenses in
violation of the laws of the State in which they are committed or of the United States, (2) Extortion, bribery, or arson in violation of the laws of the State in which committed or of the United
States, or (3) Any act which is indictable under subchapter II of chapter 53 of tide 31, United
States Code, or under section 1956 or 1957 of this tide and (ii) the term "State" includes a State
of the United States, the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of
the United States.
(c) Investigations of violations under this section involving liquor shall be conducted under the
supervision of the Attorney General.
18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)-(c) (2006).
2. Id. § 1952(b).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a)(1) (2006).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a).
5. D. Bruce Gabriel, The Scope of Bribery Under the TravelAct, 70J. CRLI. L. & CRMINOLOGY 337, 34142 (1979).
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management." 6 To make clear the intent of the proposed legislation, Attorney General
Kennedy stated:
Let me say from the outset that we do not seek or intend to impede the travel of
anyone except persons engaged in illegal businesses as spelled out in the bill .... The
travel that would be banned is travel 'in furtherance of a business enterprise' which
involves gambling, liquor, narcotics and prostitution offenses or extortion or bribery.
Obviously, we are not trying to curtail the sporadic, casual involvement in these offenses, but rather a continuous course of conduct sufficient for it to be termed a
7
business enterprise.
How did the anti-racketeering legislation of the early 1960's, tailored to stop the bribery of government officials by mobsters engaged in criminal business enterprises, morph
into the commercial bribery corollary to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)? We
can thank the House-Senate Conference Committee that hammered out the final version
of the Travel Act and the U.S. Supreme Court's 1979 decision in Perrin v. United States.8
Notwithstanding Kennedy's stated intent to target bribery by criminal enterprises engaged in one of the enumerated unlawful business enterprises, the Conference Committee
struck this requirement. 9 As noted by one commentator, this was likely in response to
then Deputy Attorney General (and future Supreme Court Justice) Byron R. White's letter of August 7, 1961, which protested the limitation because bribery and extortion practiced by organized criminals tended to be composed of discrete instances of improper
influence.' 0 Accordingly, as written, the Travel Act applies to any business enterprise
(criminal or otherwise) that engages in bribery."
While the word "bribery" seems simple enough, there was a significant split within the
circuit courts as to whether purely commercial bribery, rather than common law bribery
(involving public officials), fell within the statute's purview. 12 By 1979, the Fourth 13 and
Fifth14 Circuits held that the Travel Act used the term "bribery" in a generic sense to
mean "the act or practice of bestowing upon, or promising money or a favor 'to a person
in a position of trust to pervert his judgment or corrupt his conduct.' '"is The Second
Circuit disagreed, holding that a defendant who demanded the payment of bribes by subcontractors as a condition to receiving contracts did not violate the Travel Act, limiting
6. See In Support of Legislation to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering: Statement Before the H. Subcomm.
No. 5 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. 4 (1961) (statement of Robert F. Kennedy, U.S. Att'y
Gen.), availableat http://www.justice.gov/ag/rfkspeeches/1961/05-17-1961.pdf.
7. S. REP. No. 87-644, at 3 (1961).
8. See Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37 (1979).
9. Gabriel, supra note 5, at 337-38.
10. Id. at 338.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b)(i)(2) (2006).
12. Gabriel, supra note 5, at 338.
13. United States v. Pomponio, 511 F.2d 953, 955-56 (4th Cir. 1975) (holding that payments made to a
bank officer for the purpose of influencing his conduct with respect to loans made by his employer bank to
corporations owned or controlled by defendants violated the Travel Act).
14. United States v. Perrin, 580 F.2d 730, 734 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that payments to an employee of a
geophysical company in exchange for confidential geological exploration data from the employer violated the
Travel Act), aff'd, 444 U.S. 37 (1979).
15. Gabriel, supra note 5, at 338.
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the statute to common law bribes.16 The U.S. Supreme Court resolved the conflict, siding with the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, holding that "bribery" as used in the Travel Act
included purely commercial bribery,' 7 as "Congress recognized in 1961 that bribery of
private persons was widely used in highly organized criminal efforts to infiltrate and gain
control of legitimate businesses, as an area of special concern of Congress in enacting the
Travel Act. "' 8
Fast forward fifty years, the Department of Justice has used the Travel Act to prosecute
foreign commercial bribery in about ten cases, 19 and lists the Act as a possible alternative
charge in its "Layperson's Guide to the FCPA."20 Most recently, the Travel Act was used
against Control Components, Inc., a California company that designs and manufactures
service control valves "for use in the nuclear, oil and gas, and power-generation industries
worldwide."21 In 2009, the company pleaded guilty to a three-count information that
alleged, among other things, that from 2003 to 2007 CCI executives made 150 corrupt
payments in more than thirty countries to skew technical specifications of competitive
tenders in their favor and otherwise paid off officials of state-owned enterprises to influence the award of contracts. 22 CCI paid an $18.2 million criminal fine and agreed to the
retention of a compliance monitor for three years. 23 Since then, seven former CCI executives have pleaded guilty, the latest being David Edmonds, the former vice president of
worldwide customer service, who entered a guilty plea on June 15, 2012.24
U.S. companies doing business overseas that draw compliance policy distinctions between gifts and entertainment to private-company employees and those of state-owned or
affiliated enterprises may want to revise those policies, for ensnarement in the Travel Act
is a possible outcome if applicable state law prohibits the payment of commercial bribes.
One commentator has noted that about three-fifths of the states have laws prohibiting
commercial bribery, including California, New York, Massachusetts, Delaware, Connecti25
cut, Louisiana, and Texas.
16. United States v. Brecht, 540 F.2d 45, 50 (2d Cit. 1976), overruled by Perrin, 444 U.S. at 37 (1979).
17. The U.K. Bribery Act of 2010 similarly applies not only to public officials, but also to anyone exercising
any function connected with a business or performed in the course of employment. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23,
§§ 1, 3 (Eng.).
18. Perrin, 444 U.S. at 48.
19. The U.K. Bribery Act of 2010 similarly applies to foreign commercial bribery. The U.K. Bribery Act
applies to any entity that "carries on a business" in the U.K. While there remains some uncertainty as to
precisely what is required to satisfy this test, the U.K. Serious Fraud Office, which is responsible for enforcing
the Bribery Act, has suggested that it will treat foreign parent companies as subject to the Bribery Act simply
by virtue of havirt a local subsidiary in the U.K. See Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 10 (Eng.). Provided that a
company has a local subsidiary in the U.K., it can be held liable under the U.K. Bribery Act for any bribes
paid on its behalf for any "associated person" anywhere in the world. Id. §§ 7, 12.
20. Mike Emmick, The Travel Act - The FCPA's Red-Haired Stepchild, TOMSON RFUTERS NEws & INSiGwr (Feb. 1, 2012), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/LegalVlnsight/2012/02_-_Februaryfhe
TravelAct_%E2%80%93 TheFCPAs-red-haired stepchild/.
21. Indictment at 2, United States v. Control Components, Inc., No. 8:09-CR-00162-JVS (C.D. Cal. July
22, 2009), ECF No. 1.
22. Plea Agreement at 3, 5, Control Components, Inc., No. 8:09-CR-00162-JVS.
23. Id. at 11, 13.
24. C.M. Matthews, Seventh CCI Exec Pleads Guilty inFCPA Case, WALL Sr. J. BLOG June 15, 2012, 5:30
PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2012/06/15/seventh-cci-exec-pleads-guilty-in-fcpa-case/.
25. Emmick, mpra note 20.
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Applying the Travel Act to the facts of our hypothetical, the payment of hundreds of
thousands of dollars to executives of a publicly traded company to secure the mining project violates the Travel Act, because commercial bribery is illegal under the laws of Delaware (the state of incorporation) and California (the principal place of business), and the
money came from a bank account in the United States.
II. Bribes Paid to Government Officials to Secure Licenses and Permits
May be Illegal Under the FCPA If the Intent Is to Produce an Effect
That Would Assist in Obtaining or Retaining Business, Subject to
a "Facilitating" Defense
The Justice Department's aggressive stance against foreign bribery in the construction,
oil and gas, and aerospace industries is well known and has been widely publicized. Indeed, the FCPA26 was enacted by Congress in 1977 in response to "widespread bribery of
foreign officials by ... defense contractors and oil companies [who] had made large pay27
ments to high government officials in Japan, the Netherlands, and Italy."
Until 2004, all of the reported FCPA cases dealt directly with monetary payments or the
provision of things of value intended to obtain a foreign official's approval of a bid for a
new government contract or the renewal of an existing contract. What was not clear was
whether illicit payments to foreign officials for the purpose of avoiding other obligations,
such as the payment of customs duties and taxes, also ran afoul of the FCPA.
As for the payment of bribes in consideration for the unlawful evasion of customs duties
and taxes, the Fifth Circuit held in United States v. Kay that such conduct could fall within
the purview of the FCPA's proscriptions, provided that "the bribery was intended to produce an effect ... that would 'assist in obtaining or retaining business.'"29 In Kay, David
Kay and Douglas Murphy were executives at American Rice, Inc. (ARI), a Houston-based
company that exported rice to various parts of the world, including Haiti, through Rice
Corporation of Haiti (RCH).29 "In 1999, ARI retained a prominent Houston law firm to
represent it in a civil suit." 30 In the course of preparing the case for trial, the "lawyers
asked Kay for background information on ARI's rice business in Haiti." 31 With abundant
cooperation and candor, Kay told the lawyers that he and Murphy took various steps to
reduce the costs of importing rice by purchasing licenses called "franchises" from government officials; "permitting charities to import food without duty; paying for a 'service
corporation' designation for RCH, which allowed the company to avoid paying sales and
26. The FCPA "makes it a crime to (1) 'willfully;' (2) 'make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce;' (3) 'corruptly;' (4) 'in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything
of value to;' (5) 'any foreign official;' (6) 'for purposes of [either] influencing any act or decision of such
foreign official in his official capacity [or] inducing such foreign official to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such official [or] securing any improper advantage;' (7) 'in order to assist such
[corporation] in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person."' United
States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 439-40 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2, 78ff (2006)).
27. United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 746 (5th Cir. 2004).
28. Id. at 756.
29. Id. at 740, 762.
30. Kay, 513 F.3d at 439.
31. Id.
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income taxes by claiming that it did not actually own the products it was importing; underreporting imports to reduce duties and taxes and paying officials to accept the underreporting; and paying officials to resolve another tax issue." 32 Kay contended that these
actions were a routine part of doing business in Haiti, which was, at least at that time,
33
considered one of the most corrupt places in which to conduct business.
Broadly reading the dictates of Rule 1.12 of the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct
(Organization as Client) well before SOX's passage, 34 the external lawyers retained to
represent ARI in the civil case informed ARI's directors of Kay's and Murphy's somewhat
questionable Haitian activities. 35 The directors, in turn, self-reported these activities to
government regulators.3 6 Indictments were soon brought against Kay and Murphy,
charging them with bribery in violation of the FCPA3 7 Upon the defendants' motion to
dismiss, the district court concluded as a matter of law that "payments to foreign government officials made for the purpose of reducing customs duties and taxes [do not] fall
under the scope of 'obtaining or retaining business' pursuant to the text of the FCPA."3
The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the case for trial, holding that illicit payments
to evade duties and taxes "could fall within the purview of the FCPA's proscription," but
that "it still must be shown that the bribery was intended to produce an effect-here,
through tax savings-that would 'assist in obtaining or retaining business.'" 39 At trial,
both defendants were convicted on the uncontroverted evidence that "ARI ensured,
through bribery, that it could continue to sell its rice without having to pay the full tax and
customs duties demanded of it" and that "ARI believed these payments were necessary to
compete with other companies that paid lower or no taxes on similar imports-in other
words, in order to retain business in Haiti, the company took measures to keep up with
the competitors." 40 As noted by the Fifth Circuit, "[tihe fact that other companies were
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Similar to Model Rule 1.13 (Organization as Client), Rule 1.12 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct provides, inter alia, that "the lawyer shall proceed as reasonably necessary in the best
interest of the organization without involving unreasonable risks of disrupting the organization and of revealing information relating to the representation to persons outside the organization. (b) A lawyer representing an organization must take reasonable remedial actions whenever the lawyer learns or knows that: (1)
an officer, employee, or other person associated with the organization has committed or intends to commit a
violation of a legal obligation to the organization or a violation of law which reasonably might be imputed to
the organization; (2) the violation is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization; and (3) the
violation is related to a matter within the scope of the lawyer's representation of the organization." Tex.
Disciplinary R. Prof'l Conduct 1.12(a), (b), reprinted in Tex. Gov't Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A, (West
2005) (Tex. State Bar R. art X, § 9).
35. Kay, 513 F.3d at 439.
36. Id. Under the U.K. Bribery Act, while lawyers working in-house are likely to be subject to the internal
notification obligations embedded in their employment contracts, they are generally not subject to any requirement to notify suspected criminal activity to law enforcement agencies. See generally Bribery Act, 2010,
c. 23 (Eng.). The only circumstance in which such a positive disclosure obligation arises is under U.K. money
laundering legislation (i.e., the Proceeds of Crime Act of 2002). Lawyers working in the "regulated sector,"
which includes transactional property or corporate work, are required to file "suspicious activity reports"
(SARs) if they have reasonable grounds to suspect that another person, whether or not their client, has been
engaged in money laundering. See Proceeds of Crime Act, 2002, c. 29, § 330, sch. 9 (Eng.).
37. Kay, 513 F.3d at 439-40.
38. United States v. Kay, 200 F. Supp. 2d 681, 682, 687 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
39. Kay, 359 F.3d at 756.
40. Kay, 513 F.3d at 441-42 (discussing trial testimony).
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guilty of similar bribery during the 1990's does not excuse ARI's actions; multiple viola41
tions of a law do not make those violations legal or create vagueness in the law."
Applying the teachings of Kay to our hypothetical, the tens of thousands of dollars spent
to "substantially expedite the receipt of business and professional licenses, along with
building and environmental permits, and entry visas" could run afoul of the FCPA if the
business nexus element is satisfied and if such payments are not construed to be "facilitating" payments-an exception to the FCPA's bribery proscriptions. 42 The business nexus
element is likely satisfied, given the facts stated in the hypothetical. The payments made
to "substantially expedite" the licenses, environmental permits, and entry visas for the
foreign labor were essential to shorten the as-bid schedule completion date, lowering the
price of the offering, and thus giving the contractor a competitive advantage without
which the contractor may not have secured the work. There is no doubt the contractor in
its defense would strenuously argue that payments to expedite permits, visas, and licenses
are legal "facilitating payments" to speed up routine government actions. What does and
does not constitute a facilitating payment is well beyond the scope of this article, as it is a
topic of some debate. Suffice it to say that the size of the so-called facilitating payment
(tens of thousands of dollars or more as opposed to a few hundred pesos) might spell the
difference between freedom and incarceration.
I. Payments or the Provision of Luxury Items to Union Officials Are
Illegal Under U.S. Law and May Violate Both the Travel Act and the
FCPA
On any self-perform, direct-hire project, obtaining the cooperation of labor and maintaining labor harmony is mission critical. 43 Securing labor stability in challenging locales
where there are often competing unions with distinctly different political agendas, such as
in Venezuela, 44 often requires a "carrot-and-stick" approach, with the carrot sometimes
coming in the form of "special treatment" for one union and its officials who are in competition with another union. Moreover, in emerging economies there may be an absence
of highly skilled craftsmen, such as welders or pipefitters, requiring extensive training of
the local labor force, the importation of skilled labor from other countries, or both. En41. Id. at 442.
42. Unlike the FCPA, the U.K. Bribery Act does not include any carve-out provision or defense with
respect to facilitation payments, which are therefore illegal under English law. Nevertheless, the U.K. authorities, including the SFO, recognize the practical realities of doing business in certain jurisdictions and
have strongly hinted that, while they cannot condone facilitation payments, they are unlikely to be the subject
of an enforcement action, particularly where there is evidence that the company in question has done what it
reasonably can to phase out such payments and/or to minimize their incidence. Richard Alderman, Dir.,
Serious Fraud Office, Address at the Russia Legal Seminar 2011, London (June 9, 2011) (transcript available
at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/our-views/director's-speeches/speeches-2011/russia-legal-seminar-2011,london.aspx).
43. See, e.g., Project Labor Agreement Covering the Rochester Joint Schools Construction Board, Rochester Schools Modernization Program - Phase One art. 8, § 1 (Apr. 26, 2012), availableat http://www.rcsdkl2.
org/cms/libO4/NYO0lI 56/Centricity/Domain/73/Fully-executedPLA_4-20-12.pdf (indicating that a
Committee would meet regularly to "promote harmonious relations" with the labor union).
44. See, e.g., BAKER & McKENZIE, THE GLOBAL EMPLOYER: Focus ON TRADE UNIONS AND WORKS
COUNCILS 384-86 (Jan. 1, 2012), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.comell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1065&context=lawfirms (showing the complexity and breadth of the Venezuelan labor union system).
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suring the safety of imported labor and preventing labor disturbances once such labor
arrives at the worksite may also require "special treatment."
In the United States, securing union peace through monetary payments or the provision
of valuables, such as motor-vehicles, has long ago been outlawed by the Taft-Hartley Act
of 1947, which makes it unlawful to "pay, lend, or deliver or agree to pay, lend or deliver,
any money or thing of value" to labor representatives, labor unions, or to any officer or
employee thereof for the "purpose of" or with the "intent to influence any of [their] actions, decisions, or duties." 45 As the regulations implementing Taft-Hartley make clear,
"[t]he applicability of the Act is limited to the activities of persons or organizations within
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States." 46 Accordingly, as implemented, TaftHartley does not have extra-territorial reach-or does it?
Recall that under the Travel Act, "bribery," which is defined generally to mean bestow47
ing something of value to a person "to pervert his judgment or corrupt his conduct," is
illegal if done "in violation of the laws of the State in which committed or of the United
States."48 While there is yet no case on point, it is conceivable that the Department of
Justice may apply the Travel Act in the event foreign union officials or on-site union
representatives are provided things of value by a U.S. citizen or a U.S.-domiciled company
(or foreign subsidiary of a U.S.-domiciled company) to secure a benefit, such as to avert a
strike or to secure agreement to import foreign labor. Such payments would clearly violate Taft-Hartley, thus potentially providing the predicate U.S. law violation to support a
Travel Act charge.
A further complicating factor in labor relations outside of the United States is the fact
that in certain countries, most notably China, there is little, if any, distinction between the
government and the union.49 Specifically, the All-China General Labor Federation (the
sole national trade union consisting of 193 million members) is deeply intertwined with
the Chinese Communist Party and is not considered by the International Confederation
of Free Trade Unions to be independent of the Government of China.5 0 As such, the
provision of anything of value to the All-China General Labor Federation with the intent
to obtain or retain business 5 (such as acquiescence to the importation of skilled labor
from other countries in order to meet schedule guarantees) could be construed as a corrupt practice under the FCPA.
Applying our hypothetical, providing pay-offs, automobiles, or trips abroad in exchange
for labor peace or importation of foreign labor could trigger a Travel Act charge and, if
the union is so intertwined with the government itself, a FCPA violation.
45. 29 U.S.C. § 186(a)(1)-(4) (2006).

46. 29 C.F.R. § 451.6(a) (2012).
47. G&C MERRIAM CO., WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 104 (7th ed. 1963).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b)(i)(2) (2006) (emphasis added).
49. See Trade Unions in China: Membership Required, ECONOMIST (July 31, 2008), http://www.economist.
com/node/1 1848496.
50. Id.
51. Here, once more, the U.K. Bribery Act differs from the U.S. FCPA in that it contains no intent requirement. Rather, under the U.K. Bribery Act, companies are held strictly liable for any bribes and can only
avoid conviction if they can establish an affirmative defense of having "adequate procedures" in place to
prevent bribes from being paid on their behalf. This provision gives the company the opportunity to present
that a rogue individual was responsible, or that it was a "one off" incident rather than an overarching organizational failure. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 7 (Eng.).
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IV. When Confronted with Material Violations of Law, Breach of Fiduciary
Duty, or Other Similar Violations, What Are the Ethical Obligations of
Counsel Under Sarbanes-Oxley and the ABA Model Rules?
A large part of the rationale underpinning the 2002 passage of SOX in the wake of the
Enron, Arthur Andersen, and Tyco corporate implosions was the widely held view that
lawyers, particularly in-house lawyers, shared a large portion of the blame. Many believed
that these lawyers not only failed to interdict the fraud occurring under their noses, but
were also either actively or passively complicit in the fraudulent acts. For example, Enron's court-appointed bankruptcy examiner went to some lengths to single out the company's CLO, as well as four other high-ranking in-house lawyers, concluding in his Final
Report that they had all "committed malpractice" and were in "breach of [their] fiduciary
duties."5 2 According to the bankruptcy examiner, Enron's CLO "rarely provided any legal advice to the Enron Board" and failed to inform himself of the facts and the "governig law, so as to enable proper execution of his responsibilities as legal advisor to the
Enron Board."5 3 As to the other senior Enron lawyers, one reaped a whopping $994,174
windfall when she invested, without disclosure, $5,826 in an Enron fund called "South54
ampton" that returned $1 million in proceeds. Another lawyer actively participated in
the manipulation of Enron's financial statements by creating hedging transactions that the
55
Examiner found to be "lacking any economic substance or rational business purpose."
In a twist of historic irony, Senators John Edwards and Jon Corzine introduced an
amendment to the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act, then
being debated in the Senate, to establish a federal "minimum standards of professional
conduct" for lawyers "appearing and practicing" before the SEC and to empower the
56
Commission to discipline lawyers who transgress those standards. In the words of Senator Edwards:
The truth is that executives and accountants do not work alone. Anybody who works
in corporate America knows that wherever you see corporate executives and accountants working, lawyers are virtually always there looking over their shoulder. If executives and/or accountants are breaking the law, you can be sure that part of the
problem is that the lawyers who are there and involved are not doing their jobs....
With Enron and WorldCom, and all the other corporate misconduct we have seen, it
is again clear that corporate lawyers should not be left to regulate themselves no more
57
than accountants should be left to regulate themselves.
The essential thrust of the Edwards Amendment requires lawyers (both internal and
external) to report material violations of securities law up the corporate ladder-first to
52. Final Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner at 52-55, In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034
(AJG), 2003 WL 25544836 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2003).
53. Id. at 52.
54. Id. at 53.
55. Id. at 54.
56. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat 745 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 7245). See also Sung Hui Kim, The Banality ofFraud:Re-Situating The Inside Counselas Gatekeeper, 74
FORDHAM L. REv. 983, 1037-38 (2005).
57. 148 CONG. REc. S6524, S6551-52 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. John Edwards).
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the CLO, then to the CEO, and finally, if such reporting would be futile or otherwise
absent, an "appropriate response" within a "reasonable time," to the board of directors.58
In sum and substance, SOX section 307 is intended to place lawyers, and CLOs in particular, in the role of "gatekeepers" of corporate legality.59 This design was based on the
assumption that these lawyers are "independent professionals who are so positioned that,
if they withhold their consent, approval, or rating, the corporation may be unable to effect
some transaction or to maintain some desired status." 60
In light of the near collapse of the U.S. economy in late 2008 (the effects of which
reverberate to this day), it is fair to say that the SOX imposed role of lawyer as "gatekeeper" has utterly failed to rein in, prevent, or in any respect avoid fraud-particularly in
the financial sector of the economy. The same can be said of the ABA's half-hearted
amendments to Rules 1.13 (Organization as Client) and 1.6 (Confidentiality of Information) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 2003, which were adopted in the
hopes of avoiding even more severe federal intervention in the regulation of attorney pro6
fessional conduct. 1
To attempt to understand why the SOX "gatekeeper" function has failed, we must first
examine how the SEC implemented SOX section 307 and then understand the realities of
in-house legal practice. As implemented, the "gatekeeper" responsibilities apply only to
lawyers (in-house and external) "appearing and practicing" before the SEC.62 As defined
in section 205.2 of the implementing regulations, "appearing and practicing" is very
broadly defined to mean the transaction of business with; the representation before; or the
preparation, incorporation, and submittal of information to the SEC in any type of document.63 As a practical matter for in-house counsel of publically traded corporations, such
a definition covers virtually everyone in the legal department. In one form or another,
each attorney in the legal department will submit information that will be incorporated
into documents filed with the SEC.
What triggers an "up the ladder" reporting obligation is "credible evidence, based upon
which it would be unreasonable, under the circumstances, for a prudent and competent
attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably likely that a material violation has occurred, is
ongoing, or is about to occur."64 Plain English, this is not, as the standard contains a
58. Kim, supra note 56, at 1037-38.
59. Id. at 1034-35; see John C. Coffee, The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLuM. L.
Rv. 1293, 1297 (2003).
60. Coffee, supra note 59, at 1297.
61. Kim, supra note 56, at 1036 n.337.
62. Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the Commission in
the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. § 205.1 (2012).
63. The text of section 205.2 reads, in part, that: "[a]ppearing and practicing" before the Commission
means (i) Transacting any business with the Commission, including communications in any form; (ii) Representing an issuer in a Commission administrative proceeding or in connection with any Commission investigation, inquiry, information request, or subpoena; (iii) Providing advice in respect of the United States
securities laws or the Commission's rules or regulations thereunder regarding any document that the attorney
has notice will be filed with or submitted to, or incorporated into any document that will be filed with or
submitted to, the Commission, including the provision of such advise in the context of preparing or participating in the preparation of, any such document; or (iv) Advising an issuer as to whether information or a
statement, opinion, or other writing is required ... to be filed with or submitted to, or incorporated into any
document that will be filed with or submitted to, the Commission." Id. § 205.2(a).
64. See id. § 205.1(e) (emphasis added).
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double negative, making it difficult to understand and nearly impossible to actually enforce, placing upon the Commission the herculean task of proving two negatives. 65 Moreover, while the term "violation" is broadly defined to mean "a material violation of United
States federal or state securities law, a material breach of fiduciary duty arising under
[U.S.] federal or state law, or a similar material violation of any [U.S.] federal or state
law,"66 the term "material" is not defined. In its public release, the SEC advised that the
term should be read as understood under federal securities laws; 67 namely, a fact is material if there is "a substantial likelihood that the . . . fact would have been viewed by the
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made
available." 68 Again, this is not exactly clear and unambiguous guidance.
The further qualification that the "material violation" be "reasonably likely" adds additional murkiness to the applicable standard. Again referring back to the SEC's adopting
release, "[t]o be 'reasonably likely' a material violation must be more than a mere possibility, but it need not be 'more likely than not.'"69 As reported by one commentator, "SEC
staff members [in 2003] have unofficially stated publicly that 'reasonably likely' means less
than 'more probably than not' and that conduct in the '20 [percent to] 40 [percent] range
of likelihood' should trigger a report." 70 Relying on the oral statements of certain SEC
staff members made at a long forgotten loss prevention seminar in 2003 does not exactly
instill enduring confidence that the professed meaning would be adopted by the Commission or a court.
The ABA's reluctant amendments to Rules 1.13 and 1.6 of the MRPC likewise provide
little in the way of unambiguous guidance when Counsel is confronted with what she
believes to be credible evidence of illegal conduct or breach of fiduciary duty. In the wake
of the public's perception that lawyers contributed to the spectacular corporate implosions
of Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom, among others, the ABA formed a Task Force on Corporate Responsibility that recommended certain revisions to the ABA House of Delegates
who, by a slim margin, adopted the Task Forces' recommendations. 71 The revised Model
Rule 1.13(a) emphasizes that in the context of organizational representation, the attorney
represents the entity, not management. 72 While this is an easy statement to make, in
practice it is nearly impossible to apply, for the corporate entity is a legal fiction that
cannot act independently of management. Moreover, in-house attorneys, particularly
CLOs, who report to senior management (most often the CEO), are subject to performance reviews which, in turn, determine, among other things, compensation and job reten65. As written, the standard violates the SEC's "plain English" rules, which require the Commission to
"draft the language ... so that at a minimum it substantially complies with each of the following plain English
writing principles:. .. (vi) No multiple negatives." General Rules and Regulations, Securities Act of 1933, 17
C.F.R. § 230.421 (2012); see also Kim, supra note 56, at 1049.
66. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(i) (2012).
67. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 338185, Exchange Act Release No. 34-47276, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-25919, 79 S.E.C.
Docket 1351 (Jan. 29, 2003).
68. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988).
69. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, supra note 67, at 12.
70. Kim, supra note 56, at 1050.
71. Caroline Harrington, Attorney Gatekeeper Duties in an Increasingly Complex World: Revisiting the Noisy
Withdrawal Proposalof SEC Rule 205, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 893, 900 (2009).
72. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2004).

WINTER 2012

1020

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

tion. Conflating management with the corporate entity is the inevitable byproduct of the
fact that management, particularly the CEO, holds singular power over the career trajectory and pecuniary wellbeing of the CLO.
Rule 1.13(b) then requires that when the lawyer "knows" that a constituent of the organization is committing, or intends to engage in, a violation of law that "reasonably
might be imputed to the organization," and that is "likely to result in substantial injury to
the organization," the lawyer shall report the matter to a "higher authority" unless the
lawyer "[r]easonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization
to do so." 73 Parsing through the language of Rule 1.13(b), one can readily see a great deal
of ambiguity, creating uncertainty as to when counsel must report up the ladder.
In particular, Rule 1.13 (b)'s knowledge requirement is exceedingly narrow. As defined
by the Model Rules, the term "knows" means "actual knowledge of the fact in question." 74
Given this definition, counsel is not necessarily obligated to independently investigate the
veracity of managements' representations, which runs counter to a lawyers' basic instinct
to assume that a declarant is, if not exactly lying, at least coloring the truth to fit his or her
perception, or otherwise painting a picture in a light most favorable. Experienced counsel
knows that getting closer to some semblance of objective fact inevitably requires the asking of questions not only directed to the declarant, but to others with knowledge of the
circumstances in question, which the Model Rules do not require.
The concept that the act or decision in question reasonably might be imputed to the
organization is also highly subjective and ambiguous, giving individual counsel wide latitude to subjectively determine what may or may not be imputed. The "substantial injury"
requirement further constricts the applicability of the Rule. While the Rule does not
explicitly define what "substantial injury" means, the ABA Task Force described the circumstances as an "extraordinary circumstance of a significant failure of governance that
75
puts or threatens to put the interest of the organization into serious legal jeopardy."
But the greatest loophole of all is the final qualifier of Rule 1.13 (b), namely that reporting up the ladder is not required if the lawyer "reasonably believes that it is not necessary
in the best interest of the organization not to do so." 76 As is often the case, public reporting of adverse financial information (such as significant cost overruns on a lump sum turnkey project) will have a significant negative effect on share price. It is not difficult to
foresee that a bright lawyer who prides himself or herself on innovative problem solving
might conclude that it is not in the best interest of the organization to go up the ladder
and over the heads of senior project managers to senior corporate managers, such as the
CEO or COO, to tell them what they should already know, but may be refusing to
recognize.
The amendments to Model Rule 1.6, which expand the exceptions specifying the instances in which client confidences may be disclosed beyond the avoidance of "certain
death or substantial bodily harm," 77 are of no use to the lawyer seeking guidance on how
to faithfully discharge the gatekeeper functions of SOX section 307 and Model Rule
73. Id.
74. Id. R. 1.0(0.
75. James H. Cheek, HI et al., Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on CorporateResponsibility, 59
Bus. LAW. 145, 168 (2003).
76. MODEL RULES OF PRO'L CoNDucr R. 1.13 (2004).

77. Id.
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1.13(b). As revised, Model Rule 1.6 provides that a lawyer may (but is not required) to
reveal confidential information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain
to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and (3)
to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property
of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client's commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer's
78
services.
What makes revised Rule 1.6 practically useless is the fact that the right to divulge
confidential information is only triggered when the client has used the lawyer's services to
further the crime or fraud. While there certainly have been cases in which counsel is
directly involved in malfeasance, it is far more typical that counsel becomes aware of the
circumstance and is then confronted with the quandary of what to do about it. Rule 1.6
provides absolutely no guidance for this scenario.
Read by the light of self-interest (when counsel is compensated by stock grants and
options) and in the spirit of being an executive management "team player" and "loyal
agent," of the CEO, it is not hard to imagine that some in-house counsel will likely find it
not to be in the best interest of the organization to report damaging information up the
ladder (or out to a third-party)-particularly if there is a way to manage the problem with
delicacy and inventiveness. The convoluted "up the ladder" reporting standard of SOX
section 307, which contains the double negative of being "unreasonable" for a prudent and
competent lawyer "not to conclude" that it is reasonably likely that a material violation has
occurred, provides further disincentives to discharge the intended gatekeeper function.
But beyond the many language flaws of SOX section 307 and the Model Rules, inhouse attorneys are strongly incentivized by the realities of human nature and in-house
practice to manage problems in such a way as to avoid reporting up, particularly if that
means going over the head of the CEO to the Board, for it will inevitably strain-if not
outright destroy-the implicit bond of trust between the general counsel and the CEO,
which may be fatal to the in-house counsel's employment position. The enormous ambiguities of SOX section 307 and Model Rules 1.13 and 1.6 simply gives permission to the
in-house counsel, should the in-house counsel so choose, to avoid taking a proactive
stance, thus significantly diminishing (but by no means extinguishing) the likelihood that
the in-house counsel will discharge his role of gatekeeper.
The undeniable fact that in-house counsel strive to add value to business operations and
are under enormous pressure to find solutions does not mean, as some commentators
argue, that the "inside counsel's situation-of being a mere employee, faithful agent, and
79
team player-makes unethical behavior, at least in the form of acquiescence, likely." As
discussed below, it is not so much the position or compensation structure of the in-house
counsel as employee, team player, and faithful agent and the attendant pressures of inhouse practice that arise therefrom, nor the poorly drafted provisions of SOX section 307
or the half-hearted amendments to the Model Rules, that have combined to ensure the
failure of the SOX-intended counsel as "gatekeeper function." Rather, the gatekeeper
78. Id.
79. Kim,

supra

note 56, at 1026.
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function has failed, because SOX section 307 and most state employment laws afford absolutely no protection to the in-house counsel who faithfully serves as the gatekeeper and, as a
result, reaps the ire of "the boss," who has unfettered power to terminate at will the bothersome lawyer guarding the gate. In the words of one commentator:
Unlike outside lawyers, inside lawyers may get into employment disputes with their
client, sometimes leading to their discharge by a co-agent. While outside lawyers
also may be terminated by their clients, rarely do such acts threaten their livelihood,
as lawyers in private practice are typically diversified. Inside lawyers, on the other
hand, may be faced with the dilemma of doing the right thing and losing one's job, or
obeying one's boss and violating the law or other ethical mandates. The moral dilemma is exacerbated by the fact that, in many jurisdictions, inside lawyers have no
legal redress against management retaliation.8 0
Unlike auditor and CFO terminations, a CEO may dismiss his CLO without having to
provide notice to the Board or to shareholders pursuant to SEC Rule 8-K.81 For his or
her part, the CLO cannot disclose the reasons for dismissal, for that would likely run afoul
of Rule 1.6, which has led many courts to prohibit in-house counsel from contesting their
discharge as wrongful, if that would require the disclosure of confidential information.82
V. Up The Ladder and Out the Door: The Fatal Flaw in the "Gatekeeper"

Function
In our hypothetical, in-house counsel has been confronted with credible evidence of
commercial bribery (payments to private parties to secure a job and to union officials to
buy labor peace); potential governmental bribery, subject to a "facilitating" defense (payments to secure licenses, permits, and visas); and schedule delays and cost overruns that if
unrecovered in substantial part, may breach the company's banking covenants, threatening its very existence. On the way to the airport to return home, the executive project
director instructs counsel not to breathe a word of what's going on at the project to corporate, for he assures counsel that all is under control as he has an "oral understanding" with
his client counterpart that the client will "take care of the contractor." He calls this "elegant currency." During the flight home, counsel reviews the report of the handpicked
claims consultant, quickly concluding that while it is long on narration, it falls woefully
short on analysis and evidentiary support. From her experience, and given what the area
superintendents and controls engineer have told her, Division General Counsel concludes
that the chances of successfully recovering in an arbitration all or substantially all of the
amounts claimed and the required schedule extension are not high.
Mindful of the executive project director's instruction not to breathe a word to corporate, counsel meets with the CLO, who sent her on the exploratory mission to the project
in the first place. After hearing her report, both lawyers then meet with the company's
COO, whose face begins to redden, and whose hands begin to shake as the lawyers report
80. Id. at 1064.
81. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Form 8-K), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf.
82. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 1.6 (2004); see, e.g., Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104
(lI. 1991).
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their findings. At the end of the report, the COO (who is visibly angry) says, "you lawyers
need to stick to practicing law, and leave project development and execution to those who
know what they are doing." The COO then begins to savage the lawyers, saying, in a
raised voice that: "paying a few dollars to entertain private citizens isn't illegal in their
country and whoever heard of the Travel Act, which sounds like a bad Harlem Globe
Trotter show. Paying a bit of grease to speed up visas, permits, and licenses is expressly
permitted under the FCPA, so don't come in here with heavy-handed allegations of FCPA
violations. As for buying off the union, that's done all of the time. You said it yourself,
while U.S. law might make that a problem, the Feds say it won't be applied outside of the
United States. Finally, neither of you have engineering degrees. You wouldn't know how
to put together a CPM schedule to save your life. So who are you to say that the project is
a year late and over budget?" Without ceremony, the COO tosses the lawyers out of his
office, with a stern warning that they need to keep their noses out of his business, for
lawyers "know nothing about how projects really come together," and he has "all the faith
and confidence in the executive project director who will make things right."
What should the lawyers do now? Should they go straight to the CEO? Should they
gather more facts by talking to other project personnel? Should they follow the instructions of the executive project director and the COO to keep their noses out of the project's business, relying on their representations that matters will be made right?
Ideally, we would expect counsel to gather additional facts before providing any findings to the CEO, even though Model Rule 1.13 could be read as not requiring independent investigation. Applying SOX section 307's "up the ladder" trigger, can it be said on
the facts currently known that counsel has "credible evidence, based upon which it would
be unreasonable, under the circumstances, for a prudent and competent attorney not to
conclude that it is reasonably likely that a material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is
about to occur"?8 3 Even if this standard can be understood, do payments made to private
parties and to foreign union and government officials to ensure labor peace and facilitate
routine services amount to "material violations" of "securities law, breaches of fiduciary
duties or similar violations"? Perhaps, but further investigation probably would be prudent before the CLO runs to the CEO with his "hair on fire."
Assume that additional facts have been gathered and they show, among other things,
that payments to the private parties amounted to more than two million dollars; that the
so-called facilitating payments totaled nearly $5 million and involved, among other things,
the falsification of permits in direct violation of local law; and that the "perks and
presents" to the union officials totaled more than a million dollars. When briefed on the
massive size and purpose of the payments, external counsel advises that there is potential
exposure to the Travel Act and FCPA, though external counsel views are only
"preliminary."
As for schedule delay and cost increases, a "red team" independently formed and led by
the corporate head of project controls (a one legged crusty former iron worker who went
back to college after a horrific fall that nearly cost him his life) assessed the project to be
more than a year late, and over budget by at least $350 million and rising, because the
rainy season came early. The rain had also been worse than usual, but not beyond a 10083. Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the Commission in
the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(e) (2003).
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year storm level, providing no chance to successfully claim force majeure. Combined with
the liquidated damages of $110 million, the company would be in breach of its banking
covenants unless delays and cost overruns are recovered by way of claims. The red team
evaluated the claims prepared by the claims consultant, and while some components had
some merit, many others did not. Worse still, it was based on a "total cost" approach,
which cannot succeed under applicable law. Must Counsel report up the ladder now?
Armed with this new information, the CLO believes he has no choice but to inform the
CEO of the factual investigation, red team findings, and the preliminary views of external
counsel on the Travel Act and FCPA. The CLO makes an appointment to see the CEO
the following week-when the boss comes back into the office from his summer home.
Walking into the CEO's cavernous office, the CLO is surprised to see the head of human
resources. The head of HR demands the CLO's corporate ID, credit card, office keys,
and iPhone, and escorts him out the door, explaining that the CEO struggled over the
weekend, but in the end concluded that, "you just don't fit in."
This is not a wholly unheard of situation. For example, in December 2008, the General
Counsel of Bank of America was summarily terminated without explanation and told to
leave immediately when he sought to discuss the Bank's obligations to disclose to shareholders the massive additional losses that Merrill Lynch (who Bank of America was about
to acquire) was forecasted to incur.84 In the words of the Bank's CLO, Timothy Mayopoulos: "I was stunned.... I had never been fired from any job, and I had never heard of
the general counsel of a major company being summarily dismissed for no apparent reason
with no explanation."8 5 Bank of America later explained that the firing of the GC was just
a corporate downsizing.8 6 If Mr. Mayopoulos wanted to contest his dismissal, what recourse would he have? Answer: not much, which is the fatal flaw in the gatekeeper function foisted upon general counsel by SOX and Model Rule 1.13.87
As originally proposed, SOX section 307 contained a "noisy withdrawal" provision,
which would have required that counsel withdraw from the representation of the client in
the event that remedial steps were not taken when presented with credible evidence of
illegal activity, notify the SEC of the withdrawal, and disaffirm any possibly tainted documents.88 As originally proposed, counsel would have been permitted to disclose to the
SEC confidential information under certain conditions.8 9 Under vigorous opposition
from the ABA and the securities bar, "noisy withdrawal" was dropped from SOX. 90
Even more troubling is the significant uncertainty as to whether the whistleblower provisions of SOX (sections 806 and 1107) apply to in-house counsel. The U.S. Department
of Labor (DOL) is the agency with jurisdiction over all SOX section 806 whistleblower
84. See Debra Cassens Weiss, How B of A's GC Got Fired: Leave Now and Leave Your BlackBerry Behind,
AB.A. J. (Nov. 17, 2009, 8:08 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/how_bofas-gcgot-firedleave now..andjleave-yourblackberry behind/.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Lest tears be shed for Mr. Mayopoulos, he became CEO of Fannie Mae on June 18, 2012. See Nelson
D. Schwartz, FannieMae Names Its Top Lawyer as Cbief N.Y. TiMEs, June 6, 2012, at B4, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/06/O6/business/fannie-mae-names-new-chief.html?-r=O.
88. David Waters, Comment, The Wisdom of Whistlehlowing: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the "Noisy
Withdrawal" Provision, 34 J. LEGAL PROF. 411, 412 (2010).
89. Id.
90. Id.
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cases. 9 1 In a case filed by an in-house lawyer against his former employer, the DOL determined that the discharged lawyer was not permitted as a matter of federal common law to
use any privileged or confidential information learned in the course of his representation
92
On appeal, the Federal District Court for the Southern District of
to prove his claim.
93
Texas affirmed the DOL's decision. The Fifth Circuit reversed in part on jurisdictional
94
Whether an in-house counsel may sue for retaliatory discharge is a matter left
grounds.
to state law, which is a patchwork of conflicting opinions. For example, New York has
refused to recognize a wrongful discharge claim for inside counsel if client confidences
95
must be disclosed to prove the claim. In a formal ethics opinion, the ABA has deter96
mined otherwise.
One commentator explains the reason why a majority of courts have refused to allow
the pursuit of wrongful discharge claims if client confidences are involved as that:
[C]ourts fear that the recognition of the tort of retaliatory discharge would significandy impair the special relationship of trust between attorneys and their de facto
clients by chilling communications. Accordingly, inside lawyers' special role as lawyer-advocates supersedes their role as employees and, thus, being lawyer-advocates
requires them to potentially sacrifice their economic livelihood in order to protect
97
the 'integrity of the legal profession.'
While a noble, if not anachronistic notion, falling on one's sword for the "integrity of the
legal profession" is little solace to the spouses, sons, daughters, and other dependent family members of the lawyer summarily dismissed for no good reason and now bereft of
income and employment opportunity, all because counsel was fool enough to accept what
Congress and the ABA told him to do: act as gatekeeper against management malfea98
Adding to the untenable position of in-house counsel is the growing risk that
sance.
institutional shareholders will sue internal counsel, along with other officers and directors,
when malfeasance, such as foreign bribery, comes to light. One recent example of this is
the California State Teachers Retirement System's (CALSTRS) derivative suit against the
91. See OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OSHA FS-3490, FILING
WHISTLEBLOWER COMPLAINTS UNDER THE SARBANES-OXLEY AcT (2011) (advising employees to file
whisleblower complaints with the Department of Labor).
92. Willy v. Coastal Corp., ARB Case No. 98-060, 2004 WL 384741, at *22 (Dep't of Labor Feb. 27,
2004), rev'd in part, 423 F.3d 483 (5th Cir. 2005).
93. Willy v. Coastal Corp., 647 F. Supp. 116, 118 (S.D. Tex. 1986), rev'd on othergrounds, 855 F.2d 1160,
1162 (5th Cir. 1988).
94. Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1171, 72 (5th Cir. 1988).
95. Wise v. Consol. Edison Co., 723 N.Y.S.2d 462, 463 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
96. "A FORMER IN-HOUSE LAWYER MAY PURSUE A WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CLAIM
AGAINST HER FORMER EMPLOYER AND CLIENT AS LONG AS CLIENT IFNORMATION
PROPERLY IS PROTECTED... We conclude that a retaliatory discharge or similar claim by an in-house
lawyer against her employer is a 'claim' under Rule 1.6(b)(2)." ABA Comm. On Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-424 (2001).
97. Kim, supra note 56, at 1065.
98. In one recent highly publicized case of alleged corporate malfeasance; namely, the bribery scandal
embroiling Wal-Mart in Mexico, which involves allegations of direct complicity by in-house lawyers in rampant governmental bribery, one in-house counsel resigned because the allegations were buried and no action
was taken. See David Barstow, Vast Mexican Bribery Case Hushed Up By Wal-Mart After Top-Level Struggle,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2012, at Al, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/22/business/at-wal-mart-in-

mexico-a-bribe-inquiry-silenced.html?pagewanted=all.
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officers and directors of Wal-Mart (including three in-house lawyers), which arose from
allegations of widespread bribery in Mexico. 99 Regardless of whether CALSTRS' unproven allegations have any merit, it demonstrates that in-house counsel is between the
proverbial "rock and a hard place." Even more recently, the General Counsel to Joe's
Crab Shack, Edward Engel, was sued by shareholders over a number of accounting errors
in the registration statement for Joe's Crab Shack's $80 million initial public offering. 100
As is evidenced from these examples, counsel is effectively forced to either take up the role
as "gatekeeper" against malfeasance, risking summary termination without right of redress, or acquiesce in the malfeasance and be sued by shareholders. Either way, counsel's
career (if not his reputation) will be forever altered. Even if SOX permitted a noisy withdrawal and state law recognized claims for wrongful discharge, many, if not most, lawyers
would do all they could to avoid taking such actions, for to do so could likely forever
stigmatize them within the legal community, effectively forcing them out of their chosen
profession.
So, what can be done for what appears to be an "up the ladder and out the door"
outcome for those poor souls unfortunate enough to find themselves having to act as the
gatekeeper? CLOs must be accorded the same protections as CFOs and auditors. The
SEC should require that a Form 8-K be filed upon the departure of the CLO. More than
anything, this will stay the capricious hand of a mercurial or recalcitrant CEO in search of
more uninterested and pliable counsel. It will also strengthen the resolve of CLOs to do
what they have been educated and trained to do, and what their character and integrity
compels them to do: stand firm against material violations of securities law, breaches of
fiduciary duties, or other similar violations of the law.

99. See Verified Shareholder Derivative Compl. at 2, Cal. State Teachers' Ret. Sys. v. Alvarez, No. 7490
(Del. Ch. May 3, 2012).
100. See Class Action Compl. at 2, Campton v. Ignite Rest. Grp., No. 4:12-cv-2196, 2012 WL 3099119
(S.D. Tex. July 20, 2012).
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